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PROTECTION INSTALMENT BUYERS DIDN'T GET
WILLIAM F. WILLIER*
"Yours on easy credit terms" has become the hark and cry in
an affluent society in which every man feels entitled to be as affluent
as the next at whatever the personal cost to himself. In the years
following World War II consumer credit was introduced upon a wide
scale until, today, there is hardly a consumer good or service not avail-
able upon some sort of credit terms.' Sellers could not afford to pass
up this selling innovation, but neither could they afford to assume the
rather bad risk of the personal credit of so many buyers whom they
could not possibly know or afford to investigate. The secured credit
transaction was the answer, but also the undoing of the unwary buyer
at the hands of unscrupulous or profit-hungry sellers. In various ways,
security would often disproportionately exceed the amount of the
debt; charges for credit, hidden and otherwise, would be excessive;
fine print would conceal unreasonable terms. As easy credit became
the opiate of the people, more and more pushers made a fix more
accessible, though not less expensive. Monthly payments became the
monkey on the back of the consumer. The plight of the consumer
soon came to the attention of the legislatures of a number of states.
Existing legislation did not purport to deal with these problems or, if
so, it was piecemeal and easily circumvented. At worst, it provided
the creditor with unbridled freedom of contract and the utmost pro-
tection in realizing upon his security. Legislators were at once faced
with conflicting demands for protection from the credit seller and
financing agencies and from credit buyers. The result was the enact-
ment by a number of states of what have come to be known as Retail
Instalment Sales Acts.' The acts vary in their scope and aproach, but
generally follow a similar pattern. They require full disclosure of all
contract terms to the buyer, prescribe and proscribe a number of
those terms, and limit the security and charges for credit.' Thus, they
tend to be regulatory rather than prohibitive and at first glance they
give the appearance of broad protection to the consumer. But a care-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1953, Iowa State
Teachers College; J.D. 1957, State University of Iowa.
Of $33.1 billion in outstanding instalment credit in the United States in 1958,
almost $15 billion consisted of payments for or against automobiles. Ill. Bus. Rev.,
Nov. 1958, p. 5.
2 "As of 1959 Retail Installment Sales Legislation had been enacted in 31 jurisdic-
tions." Corman, Sales and Secured Financing 553 (1960).
3 For an excellent survey of the approaches of different states as of 1958, see Hogan,
A Survey of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell L.Q. 38 (1958).
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fill analysis of their essential provisions reveals that the protection
they afford is minimal if not minus, more often formal than real.
This article proposes to consider the effect and effectiveness of
certain major provisions of those acts. The exemplary acts of Cali-
fornia' and New York' have been chosen for this purpose and, where
relevant for comparison, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, certain exemplary chattel mortgage and
motor vehicle certificate of title acts, and the Uniform Commercial
Code are considered.
TRANSACTIONS INCLUDED
Problem of use. Retail Instalment Sales Acts clearly include the
secured transaction in which the security interest is in goods and pay-
ment of the indebtedness for the purchase price is in instalments. °
But the extent of the inclusion is not so clear. The New York act,
defining "goods" as "all chattels personal, other than things in action
or money . . .", 7
 excepts transactions with goods for "business or
commercial use"8 but nowhere defines such use. The California act 9
defines "goods" in the same manner as "consumer goods" are defined
in sec. 9-109(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code:' "If they are used
or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household pur-
poses", but California," like New York, 13 employs the same exception
with reference to "services." The dilemma presented by this excep-
tion and by the differing definition of "goods" in the two acts, so
similar in other respects, is not easy to resolve. Secured transactions
under Article 9 of the Commercial Code and conditional sales under
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act are not excepted according to
use and hence these acts are broader in their inclusion than the Retail
Instalment Acts.' 3 Chattel mortgage acts seldom define "chattels"
4 Cal. Civ. Code, Title 2.
5 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, Articles 9 and 10.
6 "Retail instalment contract" includes a chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract,
or a bailment or lease whereby the bailee or lessee can or will become the owner upon
fulfillment of terms. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 401(6); Cal. Civ. Code 1802.6.
7 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law	 401(1): This is the same definition as appears in the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act g 1.
8 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 401(1). Article 9 of the Personal Property Law deals
solely with motor vehicles as defined in 301(1) with provisions almost identical in
effect to those of Article 10. The "business and commercial use" exception is there
found in the definition of a "retail instalment sale," g 301(5).
9 Cal. Civ. Code	 1801.2.
10 Uniform Commercial Code, 1958 Official Text (hereinafter cited as UCC).
11 Cal. Civ. Code {I 1802.2.
12 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 401(2).
13 Uniform Conditional Sales Act g 9 provides expressly for sales for resale with
reference to the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course. Interestingly, Cal. Civ. Code
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but have been held to apply to all movable things without reference
to use." The California definition of "goods" and the New York
Act's emphasis upon "retail" probably correlate to mean only "con-
sumer goods and services," but if so, both imply a very narrow mean-
ing to "consumer" and hence, in many instances, thwart their purpose
of protecting the unwary buyer. It is unfortunate to exclude the small
entrepreneur such as, to use an extreme example, the energetic college
student who buys a power mower under an instalment sales contract
with which to earn summer money on the grounds that the mower
was bought not for household purposes but for a business use. Pur-
chase of cows by a farmer would likewise be excluded." Yet these
buyers are as unwary and as in need of protection as the buyer of
the home appliance. Thus, the "consumer goods" definition or "busi-
ness and commercial use" exception can provide a convenient loop-
hole to the unscrupulous seller requiring prolonged and expensive liti-
gation with doubtful results. A distinction based upon the capacity
of the buyer or the nature of the goods" would better achieve the in-
tended purpose. Both Acts might well define their application by
classifying transactions along the lines of the suggested distinctions,
but with differing maximum sums."
Unmovable fixtures. Both the California and the New York Acts
include "goods which, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to
be so fixed to realty as to become a part thereof whether or not sever-
able therefrom!'" Thus, goods are included which may be excluded
from the protective and remedial provisions of the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act." The same, in effect, is true of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, although both uniform acts apply to secured trans-
§ 1802.4 defines "retail buyer" as one who buys goods "not principally for the purpose
of resale." Article 9 of the UCC distinguishes types of goods primarily for purposes of
perfection against third parties. See definitions of "consumer goods," "equipment,"
"farm products," and "inventory,' § 9-109, and §§ 9-307, 9-312, and 9-401.
14 See, e.g., N.Y. Lien Law § 230.
15 So held in Welch v. Campbell, 197 Misc. 165, 94 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
aff'd, 278 App. Div. 605, 102 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1950). In this case, the court applied the same
exception found in the N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 64a, which amended the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act and required disclosure of terms to buyers under a "conditional sales
contract" similar to the requirements of Article 10.
16 The UCC makes such a distinction, but for other purposes. See note 13 supra.
17 The California act excludes an unsecured transaction of fifty dollars or less. Cal.
Civ. Code § 1801.3. New York limits indebtedness by "added-on" security to $3000.
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 410(2).
15 Cal. Civ. Code § 1802.1; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 401(1).
19 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 7 provides that the reservation of property in
fixtures not severable without material injury is void against those who have not assented
or, if severable, against owners and subsequent purchasers in the absence of filing in a
manner to perfect a lien upon realty.
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actions with certain fixtures whether before or after they become so."
It is possible, however, that under the broad definition of such goods
even "sticks and stones" incorporated into a structure are in-
cluded while expressly excluded by the other acts." This can, no
doubt, create an interesting skirmish between holders of security in
the real property and in the one-time personal property, while the
rights of the buyer-debtor dangle precariously somewhere in the "in
between!'
Perfection of the security interest. While the Retail Instalment
Sales Acts expressly include chattel mortgages and leases which are
security devices,22
 the term "retail instalment contract" by which the
chattel paper involved must be designated and the provisions which
must be included and excluded, create the problem of how the secured
creditor is to perfect his security interest. Traditional rigid construc-
tion of filing requirements may render a "retail instalment contract"
filed as a chattel mortgage or lease unperfected against third parties 23
By omission, the Instalment Sales Acts leave this to existing legisla-
tion and decisions. Problems of this sort would not arise under the
UCC, since formal distinctions between secured transactions are aban-
doned in favor of a functional distinction." This, perhaps, has little
direct effect upon the credit buyer, but indirectly he may suffer from
over-extension of his indebtedness induced by creditors who have
neither constructive nor actual notice of another security interest in
the same goods. Signing on the line with the "X" is easier for a buyer
than a consideration of the personal economic or legal ramifications
involved.
"Add-ons." Retail Instalment Sales Acts attempt to curb another
evil, "add-ons",25 while other acts usually do not purport to deal with
this problem." In brief, the Instalment Sales Acts limit extension of
security of prior contracts to new contracts and provide for ratable ap-
plication of instalment payments to old and new retail instalment sales
20 See UCC §§ 9-104(j) and 9-313(2)-(5); Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 7.
21 UCC § 9-313(1).
22 See note 6 supra.
23 See People v. Burns, 161 Mich. 169, 125 N.W. 740 (1910).
24 "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation, § 1-201. ". . . [T]his Article applies
so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this
state (a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures. . . ." § 9-102(1).
25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1808.1-.6; § 1804.3., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law { 410. "Add-ons"
would seem to be prohibited in New York where a motor vehicle is the subject matter
of the contract. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 302(17).
20 Cf. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 45.
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with termination of the security interest in the former when fully
paid.' These contracts take on certain characteristics of "after-ac-
quired" property transactions except that the subsequent purchases
must involve a retail instalment sale and not property acquired in
some other way." Hence, a provision such as that in the UCC which
restricts after-acquired consumer goods to acquisitions within ten
days' would either have no bearing or create a conflict of provisions.
The Code contemplates an initial security agreement which provides
for the after-acquired property," while an "add-on" contract in the
usual sense includes prior, not subsequent, transactions. In this
respect, the seemingly similar language in both exemplary acts tends
to differ in effect. The California act' allows the initial contract to
provide for adding on subsequent purchases, while the New York act
refers only to a subsequent contract in which a previous instalment
balance is included. 32 When both expressly permit adding the security
of prior contracts to that of subsequent, the language is almost iden-
tical: ". . . [S]uch [California, 'awl contract . . . may [Califor-
nia, `also'] provide that the goods purchased under the previous con-
tract or contracts shall be security for the goods purchased under the
subsequent contract. . . ."" "The contract" in the California act
must refer to that of the immediately prior language in the same sec-
tion, which is an initial contract allowing for "subsequent add-ons",
but the "previous contract" reference in the quoted sentence creates an
inconsistency." The New York act is at least consistent, for its prior
language permits "add-ons" only by subsequent contracts.' What-
ever the construction of these provisions, the protection afforded the
buyer is doubtful. In the first place, the seller will be inclined to
encourage additional purchases under the "add-on" arrangement and
his only duty to the buyer is to make the writing available to him."
27 supra note 25.
23 Cal. Civ, Code 1808.1; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 410(1).
25 UCC § 9-204(4)(b). Cf. § 9-108.
35 UCC §¢ 9-203(1)(6), 204(1) and (3).
31 Cal. Civ. Code § 1808.1.
32 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 410(1).
53 Cal. Civ. Code	 1808.1 (last sentence); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 410(2).
" Cal. Civ. Code § 1808.1 and 1810 tend to overlap in their contemplation of a
series of purchases provided for in an initial contract. The definition of "goods" in the
California act and the sentence dealing with security for "add-ons," the former taken
from the UCC and the latter apparently taken from the New York act, indicate that
the act borrows language from other statutes with the unfortunate results of incon-
sistency and conflict.
35 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 410(I).
35 Cal. Civ. Code § 1808.4; N.Y. Pers, Prop. Law § 410(1)(d).
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Only those who have been injured by the enforcement of such a con-
tract would know what the highly legalized language means in practi-
cal results. While the security interest under the prior contract ter-
minates when it is fully paid by allocation, 37
 a situation is more than
remotely conceivable where default occurs only shortly prior to ter-
mination. The buyer is not allowed to redeem the collateral of only
the prior contract. In fact no provision at all is made for redemption.
Under existing statutes, the buyer could be forced to pay the entire
amount under the "add-on" contract in order to redeem anything."
Were this not so, the add-on device would serve little more. than to
coerce the buyer to make his payments. The acts would do well to
clarify redemption statutes or prohibit "add-ons" altogether. As they
are, they reflect a Iess than satisfactory compromise of their. very
purpose.
Priorities. Were the above not enough, the acts create problems
for creditors as well. Since, under both acts, it seems the security
interest for a subsequent indebtedness could attach' only by the
subsequent contract (though in California the added debt could be
anticipated in the prior contract), an intervening lien would take pre-
cedence over the interest arising from the second contract, assuming
all perfection requirements were met at the time of the transactions."
The termination of "added-on" security when the balance due under
the prior contract is fully paid 4' confirms this conclusion. The col-
lateral of the first contract at that point ceases to secure the subse-
quent indebtedness. It is' probable, however, that unless the security
is actually added to the subsequent contract, consolidating all prior
and present indebtedness, it will be lost to an ' intervening lienor. 42
This problem would probably not arise in mere refinancing to extend
37 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1806.4, 1806.2; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 410(2), 412.
38 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 18. California has added redemption provisions
to its Retail Instalment Sales Act but makes no provision for redemption under an
"add-on" contract. Cal, Civ. Code § 1812.2.
39 "Attach" is here used in the UCC sense, § 9-204(1), requiring an agreement that
it attach, that value is given, and that the debtor has rights in the collateral.
40 The same result would be reached under UCC §§ 9-107, 301(1)(c) and (2),
312(4) and (5)(a) and (b).
41 Cal. Civ. Code § 1808.1; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 410(2). New York adds "or
(b) twenty per centum of the time sale price of the goods purchased under the subse-
quent contract has been paid, whichever event first occurs."
42 Cal. Civ. Code § 1806.4 and N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 412 provide for cancellation
of the contract and release of security when terms are performed. "The contract" re-
ferred to in these provisions would be the subsequent consolidated contract and what-
ever security was included in it. In essence, it would be a contract completely substi-
tuting for the former ones. Cf. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1, "Conditional sale"
and § 16; Cal. Civ. Code 1812.2; UCC § 9-404.
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maturity and alter payments and charges, since this would amend the
original contract, which would remain in force."
Revolving accounts. The California act specifically, and by cross
reference to other provisions, allows a "retail instalment account"
which contemplates a series of instalment sales under an "account"
agreement or, apparently, the conversion of prior indebtedness to an
instalment payment plan." Where this arrangement involves secu-
rity," it closely resembles an after-acquired property transaction which
may conflict with judicial hostility toward, or other statutory restric-
tions upon, such clauses." Otherwise, the security interest would pre-
sumably be perfected by virtue of the "account agreement" even
though it attached subsequently. Under the usual third-party protec-
tions statute, the perfection of the security would relate back to the
first agreement and thus the security interest would be prior to an
intervening lien.47
 This is the statutory scheme for "revolving ac-
counts" and similar arrangements whereby an instalment payment
automatically extends that much additional credit to the buyer. The
theory is that once the buyer is on the merry-go-round, he can never
get off. The facility with which the seller makes the credit available
and the tempting inducements he offers insure the success of the ride.
The California statute merely legalizes the practice. In New York,
any instalment contract involving security is, by definition, a "retail
instalment contract" regardless of form and, in view of the New York
act's position as to "add-ons", and the "entire agreement" require-
ment," it would seem that the "instalment account" for after-acquired
collateral would not be permitted."
43 Refinancing is allowed by both acts with method and charges restricted. Cal.
Civ. Code § 1807; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 409.
44 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1802.7 and 1810.1-.11.
45 Allowed by Cal. Civ. Code § 1810.8. Allocation of payments to prior purchases
is the same as in an "add-on" transaction. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1810.8, 1808.2.
40 See Callahan v. Auburn Production Credit Ass'n, 240 Ala. 104, 197 So. 347
(1940); UCC § 9-204.
47 See N.Y. Lien Law § 230; Uniform Conditional Sales Act §§ 4 and 5; UCC
§§ 9-204, 312(6).
45 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(2).
43 A chattel mortgage on inventory requires notice to be given creditors. N.Y. Lien
Law § 230a. Lien Law § 230b deals specifically with, among other goods, mortgages on
crops to be grown. Certain non-secured credit transactions are treated separately in
the New York Retail Instalment Sales Act. Merchandise certificates to be exchanged
for goods may be issued, but with limitations upon charges, full disclosure of terms
to the buyer, and restriction of those terms. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402A. "Retail instal-
ment credit agreements" include a merchandise certificate or other arrangement whereby
a buyer agrees to pay his "outstanding indebtedness" in instalments. Form, terms, and
charges are restricted. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 401(8) and 413. A retail instalment
obligation is simply an agreement of the buyer to pay for goods or services in instal-
ments. Restrictions are similar. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 401(7) and 402(7).
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PROVISIONS OF CONTRACT AND THEIR EFFECT
Retail Instalment Sales Acts have as their ostensible purpose
curtailing freedom of contract. Form and terms are carefully restricted
to protect the innocent buyer from the seller's fine print, especially
in the face of the effect of the parol evidence rule upon an integrated
contract" or, suiting the seller's purpose, the lack of effect upon the
multi-document, non-integrated contract." Some statutes, such as
those giving holders in due course cut-off powers," operated to the
detriment of the buyer,
Form in other statutes. The Uniform Commercial Code adopts
an extremely liberal policy toward freedom of contract, allowing the
parties to agree to choice of law, 53 to vary rights and remedies other-
wise imposed by law," and to waive those same rights and remedies.55
On the other hand, the UCC adds to its many "unless otherwise
agreed" provisions "subject to any statute" in at least one instance,"
which allows specific intrusion of the Retail Instalment Sales Act. In
spite of the open door of section 9-203(2): "A transaction, although
subject to this Article, is also subject to [designated Retail Instal-
ment Acts], and in case of conflict between the provisions of this
Article and any such statute, the provisions of such statute control
. . . ," conflict can well arise as to when there is in fact a conflict."
Other existing statutes, unless amended in keeping with the Instal-
ment Sales Acts, seldom limit the form or terms of the contract in-
volved, and then usually by indirection." Such limitations do not
have as their purpose the protection of the buyer, and they leave open
no doors for Retail Instalment Sales Acts, the latter acts providing
only an occasional keyhole for the others.
The California and New York acts both provide that the retail
instalment contract, both in form and terms, shall be the entire agree-
5° See Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co., 242 Wis. 466, 8 N.W.2d 294 (194-3)
and UCC § 2-202.
51 See Restatement, Contracts § 239-240 (1932).
52 See Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (hereinafter cited as NIL) §§ 52, 57
and 58; UCC §§ 3-302, 3-305, 3-306.
83 UCC § 1 -105(1).
54 UCC § 1 - 102(3).
55 UCC § 9-206(1), 9-318(1); cf. § 2-316.
56 UCC 1 9-201.
57 See, e.g., UCC § 9-507 and "Remedies and Penalties," infra.
58 Uniform Conditional Sales Act §5 1-3 describe the contract in broad terms;
chattel mortgage acts makes no reference as to form. N.Y. Lien Law 5 230. New York,
however, added remedial provisions and a brief form similar to those provided in its
conditional sales act, as amended, Lien Law § 239 a-I, and to the form in the Retail
Instalment Sales Act 5 402. Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Acts do not prescribe
form, see New Jersey Stats. Ann. 5 39:10-11 and 15.
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ment of the parties,59
 thus excluding separately executed security
agreements" and instruments evidencing the indebtedness." This, in
effect, supersedes the application of the parol evidence rule." Of
course, in cases of refinancing or consolidation there may be more
than one writing, but each writing, as well as the combination of
writings, must comply with the statute."
Disclosure. The form of retail instalment contracts is prescribed
from the label, "RETAIL INSTALMENT CONTRACT,"" to the
size of type." The items to be set forth have as their purpose full
disclosure of the subject matter and all amounts for which the buyer
is liable, without hidden charges or lumping of charges." In fact,
there may be no blanks in the document whether an item is part of
the contract or not." The buyer is warned at the bottom in bold type,
"Do not sign this agreement before you read it or if it contains any
blank space."" The buyer is entitled to a copy of the complete agree-
ment and the seller must deliver it in person or by mail."
The disclosure requirements of Retail Instalment Sales Acts do
proscribe certain obvious evils, such as blanks to be filled in by the
seller after signing, usually with added charges, and the lack of a
visible total of obscure smaller amounts to be paid. However, it is
doubtful that the anxious buyer will read the agreement carefully, if
at all, or even understand it if he does; nor will he be inclined to
seek legal advice in advance. Typical of the inconsistency and in-
adequacy of remedies available to the buyer are those available upon
the seller's failure to deliver a copy of the agreement to the buyer.
59 Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.2(a) ; N.Y., Pers. Prop. Law § 402(2).
60 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3) (c). See In re Finkelstein, 11 Misc. 2d 938, 174
N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
61 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(1) (indicates separate instruments may be allowed,
but they must be non-negotiable) ; Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.2(a) (separate instruments
expressly prohibited).
62 This is implied from the emphatic language invalidating a separate assignment
of wages in In re Finkelstein, supra note 60. Cf. UCC § 2-202.
63 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1807.1-.3, 1808.1-.6 (cf. "instalment accounts," §§ 1810.1-.11);
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 409, 410 (cf. "retail credit obligation," §§ 402(7), 402A).
04 Cal. Civ. Code § 1893.2(b) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(2) (a).
65 Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.2 (agreement roust be in eight point type, label in ten
point bold type) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(1), (2).
66 Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.4 (add-ons involve a "memorandum" with the terms of
the consolidated contract, to be sent to buyer before first instalment is due, § 1808.3);
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(2) (b), (4) (However, a subsequent contract of consolida-
tion or add-on need not contain the amount of credit service charge, the time balance,
or the time sale price, but the rate of service charge must be stated. These may be
included or attached after the buyer signs, but within ten days. § 410(1)(c) and (d).
67 Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.2(c); N.Y, Pers. Prop. Law § 402(2)(b).
os Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.7; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 405.
69 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 405.
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New York allows cancellation and return of payments and trade-ins
where the buyer has not received the goods or services," but
apparently leaves him to the penalty provisions if the goods have been
received." California, in addition to the penalties, holds the buyer
responsible only for the cash sale price until the copy is delivered."
Assignee's "cut-of' power. Most significant for this analysis are
the restrictions upon the terms of the contract other than upon the
chargeable items. Negotiable instruments are in effect prohibited,"
the buyer, it would at first seem, thus being allowed to retain and
assert his defenses against the seller and his assignees." However,
should a seller, not complying with the statute, employ a negotiable
instrument which is negotiated to a holder in due course," the buyer's
remedies would be solely against the seller or perhaps his immediate
assignee, for the Instalment Sales Acts do not go so far as to impair
the free flow of negotiable instruments by destroying their most im-
portant attribute." The Acts contemplate only one assignment, to
a "financing agency,"" which then becomes the "holder" of the con-
tract." While the contract may contain no blanket waiver of defenses
against the assignee," generally allowed by other statutes," a qualified
waiver is allowed which can render both the negotiable instrument and
waiver prohibitions practically nugatory. The contract may contain
a waiver of defenses against an assignee for value, in good faith, and
without notice, who receives no notice of the defenses within ten days
of the mailing of the notice of assignment with full details of the
contract to the buyer. In New York the notice must warn the buyer
that if there is error in the statement, or if he has not received the
goods, or "if the seller has not fully performed all his agreements with
you," the assignee must be notified within ten days; "Otherwise, you
will have no right to assert against the assignee any right of action
70 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 414.
71 See "Remedies and Penalties," infra.
72 Cal. Civ. Code 11 1803.7, 1812.7.
73 See note 61 supra.
74 Cal. Civ, Code	 1804.2; N.Y. Pers, Prop, Law 403(I).
75 See note 52 supra. The Acts use the negotiable instrument law term "holder" to
mean the seller or an assignee. Cal. Civ. Code §.1802.13; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 1401(15).
70 See Hawkland, Bills and Notes 3 (1956).
77 "Financing agency" is a person engaged in purchasing retail instalment contracts,
including a bank, trust company, private banker, or investment company. N.Y. Pers.
Prop. Law 401(18) (pledgee of a number of contracts to secure a loan excluded);
Cal. Civ. Code § 1802.16.
79 See note 75 supra, for definition of "holder."
79 Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.1(a) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3)(a).
80 Uniform Conditional Sales Act II 2 and 26; UCC II 9-206(1), 9-318(1). Cf.
NIL § 5(3).
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or defence arising out of the sale which you might otherwise have
against the seller!" 81
 Since the contracts are usually assigned, by pre-
arrangement, to a financing agency almost simultaneously with execu-
tion, the buyer has very little time to discover the seller's defaults.
This is especially true of defects under an express or implied war-
ranty' which may not appear for some time. An important remedy,
rescission, would seem to be lost to the buyer after that time, along
with the coercion for adjustment which its threat provided. 83 Thus,
in effect, when a good faith assignee enters the picture, the buyer's
rights are actually lessened since even defenses arising before the
assignment and notice, normally available against an assignee, are
cut off ten days after notice of the assignment. Seemingly, this would
be true of the forfeiture of charges provided as a penalty for non-
compliance with the Acts." It is absurd to expect a buyer to know
within ten days whether, for example, the complex computation of a
service charge is correct. Further, the acts allow a non-complying
error to be corrected by the seller or holder within ten days of a notice
given at any time," but a good faith assignee would not be inclined
to surrender his advantage and, if so, it becomes a gamble whether
or not the buyer ever discovers and gives notice of an error. Of course,
many factors may affect the good faith of the assignee. Shouldn't he
be required to check the provisions of the contract against the require-
ments of the Act? What is his past experience with assignments from
the same seller? At what discount did he buy the contract? But the
acts do not define good faith. Certainly a test as liberal as that used
with regard to a person's status as a holder in due course of negotiable
instruments should not be applied." Unfortunately, the seller and
financing agency seem to have complete freedom of contract in their
dealings."
Annual statement and acceleration. The buyer is entitled once
each year to a statement of account informing him of the dates and
amounts of payments and the unpaid balance. 88 The Uniform Com-
81 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3)(a) (services to be rendered more than ten days
after notice of assignment excepted); Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.2 (fifteen days allowed and
form of notice not prescribed).
82 Sales warranties are retained in secured transactions for sale of goods by the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 2 and UCC § 2-102.
83 See Uniform Sales Act § 69(1)(d), (3), (4), (5) and UCC H 2-608, 2-711.
84 See "Remedies and Penalties," infra.
t* Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.8; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(3).
86 See NIL §§ 52, 56; UCC H 3-302, 3-304; Benton v. Sikyta, 84 Neb. 808, 122
N.W. 61 (1909).
87 Cal. Civ. Code § 1809.1 ("on such terms and conditions and for such price
as may be mutually agreed upon."); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 411(1).
88 Cal. Civ. Code § 1806.2; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 407.
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mercial Code makes a similar provision." The creditor, however,
need not provide the statement absent the buyer's unlikely request.
Maturity of the obligation may not be accelerated arbitrarily
or without reasonable cause, but this is vague language likely to
create litigious questions of fact and controversies not unlike those
with reference to the negotiability of instruments." Mere default is
excepted and hence gives some clue as to what constitutes a "reason-
able cause." The Commercial Code has liberalized acceleration of the
obligation evidenced by a negotiable instrument to the extreme of
allowing any acceleration." This may be a sound commercial prac-
tice where parties involved are familiar with commercial usage.9.2
One of the reasons negotiable instruments are precluded in retail
instalment sales transactions under the Acts is to protect the non-
business buyer who is not familiar with commercial practices. A
commercially reasonable cause may be unreasonable as to a buyer
of a washing machine. Acceleration upon default alone would provide
ample protection to the secured seller or financing agency. An allowed
delinquency charge is optional and, if provided in the contract, would
be cumulative with acceleration upon default."
Prepayment and finance charges. The buyer may pay the entire
sum before maturity and is entitled to a proportional refund of
charges and insurance premiums included." This is true also of re-
financing before maturity: the sum refinanced is with refund credit
on the amount of the original contract." The credit is allowed whether
or not the buyer is in default or maturity is accelerated." Again,
this sort of restriction seems fair enough on the surface, but it is
simply the end result of a statutory pattern giving sanction to charges
which, prior to the Acts, were usurious in fact although not always
89 UCC § 9-208 (debtor may send his statement of the transaction, including col-
lateral, once each six months for approval or correction within two weeks). Chattel
mortgage acts do not provide for account statements. See, e.g., N.Y. Lien Law § 230.
Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 18 provides for buyer's demand of a statement only
for purposes of redemption.
90 Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.1(b); N.Y. Pers. Prop, Law § 403(3)(b). Under the
NIL acceleration has been allowed where there is an objective test which does not in-
clude the holder's deeming himself insecure. NIL § 4(2), (3); see Hawkland, Bills and
Notes 62 (1956).
91 UCC § 3-109(1)(c).
92 See UCC § 3-109, comment 4; but cf. the requirement of good faith, § 1-208.
98 Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.6; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law	 402(6). See "Remedies and
Penalties," infra.
94 Cal. Civ. Code § 1806.3; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 408.
96 Cal. Civ. Code § 180'7.2; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 409.
96 Cal. Civ. Code § 1806.3; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 408.
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considered such by the law." In the first place, finance charges are
based upon percentage rates applied progressively or regressively
according to the amount or the age of the chattel involved" as if
higher rates for smaller amounts or second-hand chattels are in-
variably justified. The rates tend to be higher than those which
reputable and competitive sellers and financing agencies charged prior
to the Acts. The Acts provide an incentive to make the price in-
ducingly competitive while charging the no longer questionable maxi-
mum rates. The lower price is thus often illusory.
Upon prepayment, buyers are often shocked to learn that the
amount of refund is not a simple interest computation, but is based
upon a sum-of-digits fraction." Further, if the earned service charge
upon rebate is less than the minimum charge, the minimum charge
may be retained." As a result, extremely high charges upon small
purchases are exacted and the thrifty buyer is deterred from saving
toward prepayment which, after a relatively early period, would be
economically impracticable.'
REMEDIES AND PENALTIES
The penalties provisions tend to supplement the other civil
remedies afforded the buyer or seller. Wilful violations of the Retail
Instalment Sales Acts constitute misdemeanors and if such occur, the
contract is probably unenforceable against the buyer,' except where
the holder is a good faith assignee.'" A prohibited term is void, but
97 The legal rate of interest in New York for banks and trust companies is six
per centum per annum, N.Y. Banking Law § 108. See Hare v. General Contract
Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
98 California multiplies progressive rates times the number of months from date of
execution to the date of the last instalment payment: Up to $1000, 5/6 of 1 percent;
upon the excess over $1,000, 2/3 of 1 percent, with minimum fees of $10 if the contract
is for eight months or less, or $12 if for a longer time. Cal. Civ. Code § 1805.1. New
York provides for ten per centum per annum up to $500, and eight per centum upon
the excess, with the same minimum fees as California. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 404.
Upon automobiles, the rate progresses according to age, from seven percent for new
cars to thirteen percent for automobiles more than two years old. N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law § 303.
f 0 Upon a twelve-month contract, the denominator would be 78. Thus, refund
upon prepayment at six months would not be Y2 , but.21/78.
100 See note 98 supra. In New York, for example, there would be no rebate upon
any one year contract of up to $120 at any time prepayment was made.
101
 In the simple case of the $1000 contract for one year with nothing but the
service charge of $80 added, prepayment at nine months would allow a rebate fraction
of 6/78 or 1.13 or, in dollars, $6.15.
102 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(1); Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.6. See Bratta v. Caruso
Car Co., 166 Cal. App. 2d 661, 333 P.2d 807 (1958), 1 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 102
(1959).
103 See "Assignee's Power of 'Cut-off'," supra.
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the remainder of the contract terms are enforceable.'" It is not clear
what effect this has upon the buyer's right to recover charges for
violation," 5 but neither the criminal sanction nor this severability
provision should preclude the buyer from this remedy. Otherwise, a
material and non-material violation test must be read into the Acts
with resultant uncertainty.'" Strict compliance is essential to achieve
the intended protection to the buyer.
Thus, if any violation allows the buyer this recovery, then even
though the buyer is in default, or maturity is accelerated, or repos-
session effected, he would be entitled to recover the charges, including
delinquency charges, if he could show a violation. A buyer redeem-
ing repossessed goods would have to pay only the unpaid balance less
all forfeited charges. However, it appears that "any failure to com-
ply" with the Act, presumably even wilful failures, may be corrected
by the seller or holder within ten days of notice.'" This should not
allow the seller or holder who gambled against discovery to correct
the error while enforcement is in progress thereby defeating the
sanctions of the Act; on the other hand, the clever buyer should not
be entitled to withhold notice until then in order to reap his harvest.
The correction provision is capable of reducing the Acts to mere
formalities.
The holder is entitled to collect a single prescribed delinquency
charge when there has been default for "not less than ten days."'"
This is no doubt in addition to his other remedies, such as reposses-
sion; although the "not less" clause has the characteristics of a grabe
period. Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act the seller may re-
take possession immediately upon default, in which case he could not
collect the delinquency charge,'" or he may give notice to the buyer
of intent to retake twenty to forty days before retaking.'" In the
latter case, a notice given immediately upon default would allow the
buyer to pay within ten days without the delinquency charge; a
notice given after ten days would allow the holder to collect the charge
104 Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.4; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3).
105 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(2); Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.7 (non-complying party
may not recover the service charges from buyer and buyer may recover all that he has
paid).
1" See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, 351 P.2d 768 (Cal. 1960).
107 Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.9; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(3) ; (error in service
charge on consolidated or "add-on" contract may not be corrected, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1812.9; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(4).
108 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(6); Cal. Civ. Code § 1803.6.
1" Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 16, but seller must hold repossessed goods for
ten days after retaking, § 18.
110 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 17.
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from a buyer redeeming before the repossession. The notice must
contain a statement of the buyer's rights or, if retaking occurs without
notice," a statement of the sum due must be given the buyer upon
his demand under penalty of forfeiture, plus damages to the buyer."'
The Code makes no provision for notice of intent to retake, the right
accruing immediately upon default."' Further, the secured party
need not hold the repossessed collateral for any length of time and,
in the case of consumer goods, where the buyer has paid at least sixty
per cent of the sum due, he must dispose of the collateral within ninety
days. 114 Redemption is allowed at any time prior to disposition."'
Curiously, the Code penalizes the secured party for failure to comply
with Part 5 of Article 9 by imposing a forfeiture of the credit service
charge plus an additional sum 118 which tends to overlap with the
similar penalties of the Retail Instalment Acts.
CONCLUSION
From the above analysis it should be apparent that the two
exemplary Retail Instalment Sales Acts were enacted with little
correlation to existing legislation. They have imposed new, complex,
and often conflicting terminology and requirements upon the secured
sales transaction involving an innocent and unwary buyer. In more
instances than not, the buyer, who is the object of their shelter, re-
ceives less protection than without them. The buyer's need for pro-
tection is obvious, but a great deal more thought, research and drafts-
manship must go into legislation which will meet his need. Merely
drawing the pushers from the street corners and the public view will
curtail neither their activities nor the addiction which they impose and
sustain. Uniform legislation is called for.
111 Id.
112 Uniform Conditional Sales Act 18. See "Annual Statement and Acceleration,"
supra.
113 UCC § 9-503.
114 UCC §§ 9-504(1), 9-505(1).
115 UCC § 9-506.
116 UCC § 9-507(1).
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